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 1 Introduction
We study simple coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned
into coalitions and agents have preferences over the coalitions they are members of. Fol-
lowing the terminology proposed by Dr` eze and Greenberg (1980), we focus on problems
characterized by the “hedonic” aspect of coalition formation. Agents’ preferences only
depend on the identity of the members of the coalition they belong to. Hence, we exclude
the existence of externalities among diﬀerent coalitions. Relevant examples of such prob-
lems are matching problems such as marriage and roommate problems, or the formation
of social clubs, teams, and societies.
The formation of coalitions is a relevant phenomenon in a wide variety of social and
economic environments. The rationale behind the formation of coalitions is that agents
form groups in order to exploit the joint beneﬁts of cooperation. The literature on Coali-
tional Game Theory has extensively analyzed the existence of stable partitions in hedonic
coalition formation problems.1 Instead, we propose a social choice and implementation
approach. We study coalition formation rules that associate to each proﬁle of agents’ pref-
erences a partition of the group of agents. A coalition formation rule can be interpreted
as an optimal recommendation for the society that represents an optimal compromise
between the conﬂicting preferences of the agents. However, since preferences are not ob-
servable, they must be elicited from the agents. Thus, given a coalition formation rule,
a fundamental concern is whether or not agents have the incentive to reveal their true
preferences. In this paper, we analyze the possibility of devising coalition formation rules
that always give agents such an incentive. Hence, we are interested in rules that satisfy
strategy-proofness. Strategy-proofness is the strongest decentrability property. It implies
that it is a dominant strategy for the agents to straight-forwardly reveal their preferences.
Moreover, each agent needs to know only her own preferences to compute her best choice.
It is well known that the requirements of strategy-proofness are hard to meet. In the
abstract model of social choice, Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) show that –
provided there are more than two alternatives at stake– every strategy-proof social choice
rule is dictatorial. However, reasonable strategy-proof rules exist if appropriate restric-
tions are imposed on agents’ preferences. In coalition formation problems, such domain
1For further references, see the recent works by Banerjee, Konishi, and S¨ onmez (2001), Barber` a and





























srestrictions arise naturally. On the one hand, while coalition formation rules select a
partition for each preference proﬁle, each agent only cares about the coalition she is a
member of. On the other hand, additional restrictions on how an agent may compare
diﬀerent coalitions can be easily justiﬁed. For instance, an interesting class of problems
consists of situations in which there are no complementarities among the members of a
coalition. That is, the preferences of an agent i regarding the convenience of an agent j
joining the coalition i belongs to, do not depend on the coalition to which i is assigned.2
Then, agents’ preferences are additively representable or separable. These domains of
preferences have been studied in the general context of abstract social choice by Barber` a,
Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) and Le Breton and Sen (1999), among others, and positive
results have been obtained. Yet, the possibility of constructing strategy-proof coalition
formation rules when agents’ preferences are additively representable or separable has not
been addressed in the literature.
Besides strategy-proofness, we would like our rules to satisfy four additional proper-
ties. Our rules should be individually rational, Pareto eﬃcient, non-bossy, and ﬂexible.
Individual rationality is a participation constraint. It means that no agent should ever
be worse-oﬀ than she would be if staying alone. Pareto eﬃciency requires that the whole
society of agents should not prefer a partition formed by feasible coalitions rather than
forming the partition that the rules recommends. Non-bossiness is a collusion-proof re-
quirement. It says that if a change in an agent’s preferences does not aﬀect the coalition
to which this agent is assigned, then the remaining agents are also unaﬀected by this
change of preferences. Flexibility is implied by Pareto eﬃciency. It says that every parti-
tion formed by a collection of feasible coalitions belongs to the range of the rule. Hence,
ﬂexibility implies that feasible disjoint coalitions are mutually compatible.
We provide two characterizations of a family of rules, the family of single-lapping
rules, that fulﬁll the previous axioms in minimally rich domains of preferences (as the
domain of additively representable preferences). Single-lapping rules are characterized
by strong restrictions over the set of feasible coalitions –the single-lapping property– that
can be justiﬁed by the initial existence of a hierarchical structure of the society. The
2Think, for example, in the preferences of a senior member of an Economics Department about the
job–candidates for two tenure–track positions that are available (but that need not to be ﬁlled). Suppose
that there are two candidates, a macroeconomist and an econometrician. If the senior economist prefers
hiring the macroeconomist rather than not hiring anybody, then the senior economist should also prefer





























ssingle-lapping property was ﬁrstly introduced by P´ apai (2004), who shows that it is a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a unique core-stable partition of the
society for every proﬁle of agents’ preferences. In fact, single-lapping rules always select
the unique core-stable partition of the society, in the sense that no feasible coalition of
agents unanimously prefer joining each other rather than staying at the coalition they are
assigned to. Hence, our results provide further evidence on the relation between the non-
cooperative game theory concept of strategy-proofness and the cooperative game theory
concept of the existence of a unique core-stable partition.
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, we review the most related literature.
This paper is is closely related to the already mentioned P´ apai (2004). P´ apai’s main
focus is on ﬁnding necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the set of feasible coalitions for t
uniqueness of core-stable partitions. Additionally, this author shows that, given an initial
set of coalitions that satisfy the single-lapping property, its associated single-lapping
rule is the unique rule that satisﬁes strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto
eﬃciency when agents’ preferences over coalitions are restricted to prefer any coalition in
the initial set to any other coalition. Our analysis complements P´ apai’s results in several
directions. We show that the single-lapping structure of the set of feasible coalition is
implied directly by strategy-proofness and the remaining axioms. Moreover, we show that
the results also hold in more restricted domains of preferences over coalitions.
The manipulability of coalition formation rules has also been studied by Alcalde and
Revilla (2004), Cechl´ arov´ a and Romero-Medina (2001), S¨ onmez (1999), and Takamiya
(2003). However, these works focus on diﬀerent domains of preferences that are not con-
sistent with additively representable or separable preferences. More speciﬁcally, Alcalde
and Revilla (2004), and Cechl´ arov´ a and Romero-Medina (2001) assume that agents’ pref-
erences over coalitions are based on the best or the worst group of agents in each coalition.
In these environments, they prove the existence of strategy-proof rules that always select
core-stable partitions. Finally, S¨ onmez (1999) proposes a general model of allocation of
indivisible goods which includes our coalition formation model as a special case. This au-
thor focuses on problems for which there always exist core-stable partitions. Under some
assumptions on agents’ preferences, S¨ onmez (1999) shows that there exist strategy-proof,
individually rational, and Pareto eﬃcient rules only if the set of core-stable partitions
is always essentially single-valued. Takamiya (2003) proves that the converse result also





























sconsumption externalities– that are fulﬁlled in coalition formation problems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model and basic notation. In Section 3, we present diﬀerent domains of preferences over
coalitions and the notion of minimally rich domain. In Section 4, we introduce the main
axioms while in Section 5 we present single-lapping rules and provide the characterization
results. In Section 6, we prove Theorem 2. We include the proofs of some intermediate
results and supplemental material in the Appendices.
2 Basic Notation
Let N ≡ {1,...,n} be a society consisting of a ﬁnite set of at least 3 agents, (n ≥ 3).
We call a non-empty subset C ⊆ N a coalition. Let N denote the set of all non-empty
subsets of N. For each C ∈ N, let [C] ≡ {{i} : i ∈ C}. A collection of coalitions is
a set of coalitions Π ⊆ N that contains all singleton sets, [N] ⊆ Π. Let σ be a partition
of N and let Σ denote the set of all partitions of N. For each i ∈ N and each σ ∈ Σ, we
denote by σi ∈ σ the coalition in σ to which i belongs.
For each i ∈ N, let Ci ≡ {C ⊆ N, i ∈ C}. That is, Ci is the set of all coalitions to
which i belongs. A preference for i, %i, is a complete order on Ci.3 For each i ∈ N,
we denote by Di the set of all preferences for i. Note that preferences are strict. Hence,
for each i ∈ N, each %i∈ Di, and each C,C0 ∈ Ci, we write C i C0 to indicate that i
strictly prefers C to C0, and C %i C0 to indicate that either C i C0 or C = C0. We
assume that agents only care about the coalition they belong to, then agents’ preferences
over partitions are completely deﬁned by their preferences over coalitions. Thus, abusing
notation, we say that for each i ∈ N, each %∈ Di, and each σ, σ0 ∈ Σ, σ is at least as
good as σ0, σ %i σ0, if and only if σi %i σ0
i.
For each i ∈ N, each set of coalitions X ⊆ N with X ∩ Ci 6= ∅, and each %i∈ Di, let
top(X,%i) be the coalition in X ∩ Ci that is ranked ﬁrst according to %i.
Let D ≡ ×i∈NDi. We call %∈ D a preference proﬁle. For each C ⊂ N, DC = ×i∈CDi,
while for each %∈ D, %C∈ DC denotes the restriction of proﬁle % to the preferences of
the agents in C.
Let ˜ D ⊆ D, we say that ˜ D is a cartesian domain if for each i ∈ N there is ˜ Di ⊆ Di
such that ˜ D = ×i∈N ˜ Di.





























sWe are interested in rules that associate a partition of the society to each proﬁle of
agents’ preferences.
Let ˜ D ⊂ D be a cartesian domain. A (coalition formation) rule deﬁned on the
domain ˜ D is a mapping ϕ : ˜ D → Σ.
Naturally, for each i ∈ N and each %∈ ˜ D, ϕi(%) denotes the coalition in ϕ(%) to
which i belongs.
Finally, Rϕ denotes the range of ϕ, that is, the set of feasible partitions,
R
ϕ ≡ {σ ∈ Σ, such that there is %∈ ˜ D, ϕ(%) = σ},
while, F ϕ denotes the set of feasible coalitions,
F
ϕ ≡ {C ∈ N, such that for some σ ∈ R
ϕ, C ∈ σ}.
3 Restricted Domains of Preferences over Coalitions
We start by presenting two classes of preferences over coalitions – top and bottom pref-
erences– that play a crucial role in our analysis. Both domains are contained in other
domains of preferences that have been extensively analyzed in the social choice litera-
ture, namely, the domains of additively representable and separable preferences. Top and
bottom preferences are obtained by extending orders over single agents to orders over
coalitions. The basic idea behind top and bottom preferences is that each agent i divides
the society into two groups according to some order over the set of agents: the agents
that she likes and the agents she dislikes. An agent equipped with top preferences pri-
oritizes (lexicographically) joining the agents she likes the most with respect to avoiding
the agents she dislikes. On the other hand, an agent equipped with bottom preferences
prioritizes (lexicographically) avoiding the agents she dislikes the most with respect to
joining the agents she likes.
Let P be the set of all complete orders over N. For each P ∈ P, R denotes the
weak order associated to P and it is deﬁned in the usual way. For each C ⊆ N and
each P ∈ P, max(C,P) and min(C,P) denote, respectively, the ﬁrst-ranked and the
last-ranked agent of C according to P. Next, for each i ∈ N, each P ∈ P, and each
C ∈ Ci, let C
+
i (P) ≡ {j ∈ C, s.t. j R i}, and C
−
i (P) ≡ {j ∈ C s.t. i R j}. Now, de-
ﬁne C
+
i (1,P) ≡ max(C
+
i (P),P) and C
−
i (1,P) ≡ min(C
−

































i (t,P) are deﬁned for some t ≥ 1, iteratively, let
C
+




























For each i ∈ N and each P ∈ P, the preference %i∈ Di is the top preference
associated to P by i, %i=%
+
i (P) if for each two distinct coalitions C,C0 ∈ Ci, C i C0
if and only if
• C
+
i (P) 6= C
0+
i (P) and C
+
i (t,P) P C
0+
i (t,P), where t is the ﬁrst integer such that
C
+





i (P) = C
0+
i (P) and C
−
i (t0,P) P C
0−
i (t0,P), where t0 is the ﬁrst integer such that
C
−
i (t0,P) 6= C
0−
i (t0,P).
Let i ∈ N, P ∈ P, and let C,C0 ∈ Ci be such that C 6= C0. When comparing the
coalitions C and C0, if agent i is equipped with preference %
+
i (P), then she focuses on
the sets of agents who are ranked above i according to P, C
+
i (P) and C
0+
i (P). First,
i compares C and C0 on the basis of the agents who are ﬁrst-ranked according to P in
C
+
i (P) and C
0+
i (P). If these agents are the same, then i compares the second-ranked
agents and so on. If C
+
i (P) = C
0+
i (P), then i turns her attention to the agents who are
ranked below i according to P, C
−
i (P) and C
0−
i (P), and applies the same lexicographic





i (P), and she proceeds iteratively in the case that they are the same agent.
The logic behind bottom preferences mimics top preferences.
For each i ∈ N and each P ∈ P,, the preference %i∈ Di is the bottom preference
associated to P by i, %i=%
−
i (P) if for each two distinct coalitions C,C0 ∈ Ci, C i C0
if and only if
• C
−
i (P) 6= C
0−
i (P), and C
−
i (t,P) P C
0−
i (t,P), where t is the ﬁrst integer such that
C
−





i (P) = C
0−
i (P) and C
+
i (t0,P) P C
0+
i (t0,P), where t0 is the ﬁrst integer such that
C
+































sLet i ∈ N, P ∈ P, and let C,C0 ∈ Ci be such that C 6= C0. When comparing the
coalitions C and C0, if agent i is equipped with the preference %
−
i (P), then i focuses
on the sets of agents who are ranked below i according to P, C
−
i (P) and C
0−
i (P). First,
i compares C and C0 on the basis of the agents who are last-ranked according to P in
C
−
i (P) and C
0−
i (P). If these agents are the same, then i compares the next-to-the-last
ranked agents and so on. If C
−
i (P) = C
0−
i (P), then i turns her attention to the agents who
are ranked above i according to P, C
+
i (P) and C
0+
i (P), and applies the same lexicographic





i (P), and she proceeds iteratively in the case that they are the same agent.
For each i ∈ N, let
D
+
















Let ¯ D ⊆ D. We say that ¯ D is minimally rich if ¯ D is cartesian and D∗ ⊆ ¯ D.
We consider that a domain of preferences over coalitions is minimally rich if it contains
top and bottom preferences. Minimal richness also requires that the domain is cartesian.
That is, an agent’s set of admissible preferences does not depend on the preferences of
the remaining agents.
The following remark shows that in minimally rich domains, the preferences of an
agent regarding the way in which she may compare the coalition in which she stays on
her own and any two other diﬀerent coalitions she may belong to are not restricted.
Remark 1. For each i ∈ N and each two distinct C, C0 ∈ Ci \{i}, there exist %,%0,%00∈
D∗
i such that:
{i}  C  C0,
C 0 {i} 0 C0, and
C 00 C0 00 {i}.
It can be argued that top and bottom preferences reﬂect rather extreme preferences
over coalitions. However, the domains of additively representable and separable prefer-
ences are minimally rich. These domains exclude the possibility of (negative or positive)





























sLet i ∈ N. A utility function for agent i is a mapping ui : N → R such that
ui(i) = 0. A preference for agent i, %i∈ Di is additively representable if there is a




c0∈C0 ui(c0). For each i ∈N, Ai denotes the set of all i’s additively representable prefer-
ences for agent i and let A ≡ ×i∈NAi.
A preference for i, %i∈ Di, is separable if for each j ∈ N and each C ∈ Ci such
that j / ∈ C, {i,j} i {i} if and only if (C ∪ {j}) i C. Let Si be the set of all agent i’s
separable preferences and let S ≡ ×i∈NSi.
The following remark shows that the domain of additively representable preferences
and the domain of separable preferences are indeed minimally rich domains. Moreover,
for small societies both domains coincide with the smallest minimally rich domain.
Remark 2. Let i ∈ N.
(a) If n ≥ 4, then D∗
i ⊂ Ai ⊂ Si.
(b) If n = 3, then D∗
i = Ai = Si.
4 Axioms
This section introduces four properties that rules may satisfy. Let ˜ D ⊆ D be a cartesian
domain and let ϕ be a rule deﬁned on ˜ D.
Our main axiom is an incentive constraint. A rule should never provide an incentive
for an agent to misreport her preferences. Only if a rule elicits the true preferences from
the agents, the social choice will be based upon the correct information. Of course, this
property refers to the speciﬁc domain in which the rule is deﬁned.
Strategy-Proofness. For each i ∈ N, each %∈ ˜ D, and each %0
i∈ ˜ Di, ϕi(%) %i ϕi(%N\{i},%0
i).
Conversely, we say that i ∈ N manipulates ϕ if there exist %∈ ˜ D and %0
i∈ ˜ Di such that
ϕi(%N\{i},%0
i) i ϕi(%).
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that every strategy-proof rule on an un-
restricted domain either is dictatorial or its range contains only two elements.4 As we






























sassume that agents’ preferences over social outcomes are restricted to depend only on
the coalitions they are members of and we focus on minimally rich domains, the negative
consequences of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem do not apply to our framework.
We also consider a minimal participation constraint. Agents should not prefer to stay
on their own rather than to belong to the coalition that the rule assigns them.
Individual Rationality. For each i ∈ N and each %∈ ˜ D, ϕi(%) %i {i}.
Note that, for every individually rational rule, its set of feasible allocations is a collec-
tion of coalitions.
We introduce a weak version of eﬃciency. This notion of eﬃciency for coalition for-
mation problems is introduced in P´ apai (2004).
Pareto eﬃciency. For each %∈ ˜ D, there is no σ ∈ Σ such that for each C ∈ σ, C ∈ F ϕ,
and for every i ∈ N, σi %i ϕi(%), and for some j ∈ N, σj j ϕj(%).
Note that Pareto eﬃciency is a version of eﬃciency restricted to the set of feasible
range of the rule. Pareto eﬃciency does not implies onto-ness.5 That is, it may be the
case that a Pareto eﬃcient rule does not admit every conceivable coalition as feasible.
We consider rules such that whenever a change in an agent’s preference does not
change the coalition she is assigned to, then the assignment for the remaining agents does
not change.
Non-Bossiness. For each i ∈ N, each %∈ ˜ D, and each %0
i∈ ˜ Di, ϕi(%) = ϕi(%N\{i},%0
i)
implies ϕ(%) = ϕ(%N\{i},%0
i).
We can interpret non-bossiness as a collusion-proof or bribe-proof condition. Imagine
that there exists a transferable private good and that agents preferences over coalitions
and private good allocations are lexicographic. Agents focus ﬁrst on the coalition they are
assigned, and then in the private good allocation. A violation of non-bossiness implies
a possibility of collusion because an agent might have incentives to misrepresent her





























spreferences in exchange for a positive transfer of the private good from those who beneﬁt
from the change in her preference report.
Finally, we introduce a minimal ﬂexibility condition on the range of the rule. We
assume that the range of a rule is determined by the set of feasible coalitions.
Flexibility. For each σ = {C1,...,Cm} ∈ Σ, Ct ∈ F ϕ for each t = 1,...,m, implies
σ ∈ Rϕ.
Flexibility means that any two disjoint feasible coalitions are mutually compatible.
Hence, it implies that the range of the rule is completely determined by the set of feasible
coalitions. Flexibility is implied by Pareto eﬃciency, but ﬂexibility does not implies onto-
ness. By focusing on ﬂexible rules, we rule out some coalition formation problems. For
instance, any rule deﬁned in a four-agent society, in which every couple of agents is a
feasible coalitions but partitions containing two couples are not admissible would violate
ﬂexibility.
5 Characterization Results
In this section we analyze the implications of the axioms listed above over rules deﬁned on
rich domains. First, we introduce additional notation due to P´ apai (2004). This author
proposes a property over sets of coalitions – the single-lapping property– that ensures the
existence and uniqueness of a core-stable partition for every preference proﬁle.6 We make
use of this property to deﬁne a class of rules.
A collection of coalitions Π satisﬁes the single-lapping property if
Condition (a): For each C,C0 ∈ Π, C 6= C0 implies #(C ∩ C0) ≤ 1.
Condition (b): For each {C1,...,Cm} ⊆ Π with m ≥ 3 and for each t = 1,...,m,
#(Ct∩Ct+1) ≥ 1 (where m+1 = 1), there is i ∈ N such that for each t = 1,...,m,
Ct ∩ Ct+1 = {i}.
6Given a preference proﬁle %∈ D and a collection of coalitions Π ⊆ N, the partition σ ∈ Σ is





























sCondition (a) states that if there is an overlap between any two coalitions in the
collection, there cannot be more than one agent who is member of these two coalitions.
Condition (b) is a non-cycle condition. It requires that if a set of coalitions in the collection
form a cycle in which every two neighbor coalitions have a common member, then all these
coalitions have the same common member.
P´ apai (2004) shows that single-lapping collections of coalitions can be associated to
a non-directed graph endowed with a tree or network structure. Tree structures are
characteristic to many hierarchical societies or networks in which only members of adjacent
levels in the hierarchy (network) are connected and can form a coalition.7
The following remark presents a prominent property of single-lapping collections of
coalitions. For every single-lapping collection of coalitions and for every preference proﬁle,
there is a coalition in the collection such that all its members think that this coalition is
the best coalition in the collection.
Remark 3. (P´ apai, 2004, Theorem 1). Let Π be a single-lapping collection of coalitions.
For each %∈ D there is C ∈ Π such that for each i ∈ C, C = top(Π,%i).
Remark 3 implies that for every single-lapping collection of coalitions and every pref-
erence proﬁle there is a unique core-stable partition of the society. P´ apai (2004) presents
the following algorithm to ﬁnd such partition.
For each %∈ D and each single-lapping collection of coalitions Π ⊂ N, the core-
stable partition associated to Π at proﬁle %, ¯ σΠ(%), can be identiﬁed by the
following algorithm:
Algorithm: (P´ apai, 2004). Let %∈ D and let Π be a single-lapping collection of coali-
tions. Find C ∈ Π such that for each i ∈ C, top(Π,%i) = C. As Π is single-lapping,
such coalition exists. Note that there may be several such coalitions, and all these
coalitions are disjoint. Let
Π(1,%) ≡ Π,
M
Π(1,%) ≡ {C ∈ Π such that for each i ∈ C,top(Π,%i) = C}
T
Π(1,%) ≡ ∪C∈MΠ(1,%)C
Hence, MΠ(1,%) denotes the set of all the coalitions that are formed in this ﬁrst
stage and T Π(1,%) denotes the set of agents that are matched in the ﬁrst stage.





























sOnce Π(t,%), MΠ(t,%), and T Π(t,%) are deﬁned for some t ≥ 1, let,
Π(t + 1,%) ≡ {C ∈ Π such that C ∩ T
Π(t,%) = {∅}},
M
Π(t + 1,%) ≡ {C ∈ Π(t + 1,%) such that for each i ∈ C,top(Π(t + 1,%),%i) = C} and,
T
Π(t + 1,%) ≡ ∪C∈MΠ(1,%)∪...∪MΠ(t+1,%)C.
Note that, for each t = 1,...,m, Π(t,%) ⊂ Π, Π(t,%) is a collection of coalitions
for the reduced society N \ T Π(t,%). Moreover, Π(t,%) satisﬁes the single-lapping
property. Let m ≤ n be the smallest integer such that T Π(m,%) = N. Then, the
algorithm identiﬁes a unique partition,
¯ σ
Π(%) ≡ {C ∈ Π such that for some t ≤ m, C ∈ M
Π(t,%)}.
For each single-lapping collection of coalitions and each preference proﬁle there is a
unique core-stable partition. Thus, each single-lapping collection of coalitions deﬁnes a
unique rule.
Let ˜ D ⊆ D be a cartesian domain of preferences and let ϕ be a rule deﬁned on ˜ D.
The rule ϕ is a single-lapping rule if there is a single-lapping collection of coalitions
Π such that for each %∈ ˜ D, ϕ(%) = ¯ σΠ(%).
P´ apai (2004, Theorem 1) shows that, given a ﬁxed single-lapping collection of coali-
tions Π, if agents are restricted to prefer standing on their own to any other coalition
C / ∈ Π, then the single-lapping rule associated to Π is the unique rule that satisﬁes
strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto eﬃciency. Note that for every single-
lapping rule, for each preference proﬁle there is always a feasible coalition such that all its
members think that it is their best preferred feasible coalition. Thus, single-lapping rules
clearly satisfy strategy-proofness in any minimally rich domain. In fact, single-lapping
rules also satisfy individual rationality, non-bossiness, ﬂexibility, and Pareto eﬃciency.
Theorem 1. Let ¯ D be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : ¯ D → Σ is single-lapping,
then ϕ satisﬁes strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, ﬂexibility, and
Pareto eﬃciency.
Proof. Let F ϕ = Π. Because ϕ is a single-lapping rule, Π is a single-lapping collection
of coalitions. Let us check that ϕ satisﬁes strategy-proofness.8 Let %∈ ¯ D. For each i ∈





























sT Π(1,%), ϕi(%) = top(Π,%i). Thus, agents in T Π(1,%) cannot manipulate. Moreover,
by the deﬁnition of single-lapping rule for each %0∈ ¯ D such that for each i ∈ T Π(1,%)
%i=%0
i, ϕi(%) = ϕi(%0). Now, let j ∈ T Π(2,%). If there exists C ∈ Π such that
C j ϕj(%), then there is i ∈ T Π(1,%)) such that i ∈ C. Note that for each %0
j∈ ¯ Dj
and each i ∈ T Π(1,%), ϕi(%N\{j},%0
j) = T Π(1,%). Thus, ϕj(%) %j ϕj(%N\{j},%0
j) and j
cannot manipulate. Repeating iteratively the argument with the remaining steps of the
algorithm, we obtain that no agent can manipulate.
Let us check that ϕ satisﬁes individual rationality. By the deﬁnition of single-lapping
rule, for each i ∈ N and each %∈ ¯ D, there is t ≤ n such that ϕi(%) ∈ MΠ(t,%). Note
that {i} ∈ Π(t,%). By the deﬁnition of single-lapping rule, ϕi(%) ≡ top(Π(t,%),%i).
Thus, ϕi(%) %i {i}, which proves individual rationality.
Let us check that ϕ satisﬁes non-bossiness. Let i ∈ N, %∈ ¯ D, and %0
i∈ ¯ Di be such that
ϕi(%) = ϕi(%N\{i},%0
i). Let i ∈ T Π(t,%). Because ϕ is a single-lapping rule, for each
j ∈ ∪t0≤tT Π(t0,%), ϕj(%) = ϕj(%N\{i},%0
i). Moreover, because ϕi(%) = ϕi(%N\{i},%0
i),
for each k ∈ ∪t0≥tT Π(t0,%), we have ϕk(%) = ϕk(%N\{i},%0
i). Then, ϕ(%) = ϕ(%0), which
proves non-bossiness.
Let us check that ϕ satisﬁes ﬂexibility. Let σ = {C1,...,Cm} ∈ Σ be such that for
each t = 1,...,k, Ct ∈ Π. Let %∈ ¯ D be such that for each t = 1,...,m and each i ∈ Ct,
top(N,%i) = Ct. By the deﬁnition of single-lapping rule, ϕ(%) = σ and σ ∈ Rϕ. Thus,
ϕ satisﬁes ﬂexibility.
Finally, Pareto eﬃciency follows immediately from the deﬁnition of single-lapping
rule. Note that for each i ∈ N and each %∈ ¯ D there is t ≤ n such that ϕi(%) =
top(Π(t,%),%i).
Note that we only need to assume that the domain of the rule is minimally rich in
proving ﬂexibility. The proof of the remaining axioms is domain independent. Note also
that single-lapping rules satisfy strategy-proofness even in the unrestricted domain of
preferences over coalitions D. By restricting the set of feasible coalitions, single-lapping
rules eliminate agents’ opportunities for proﬁtable misrepresentation of preferences. Our
next results are, in some way, more surprising. In every minimally rich domain, single-
lapping rules are the only rules that satisfy our list of axioms. Hence, reducing the set of
admissible preferences for the agents does not allow for additional rules.





























sproofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and ﬂexibility if and only if ϕ is a single-
lapping rule.
We present the proof of necessity part of Theorem 2 in the next section. The intuition
runs as follows. For every rule that satisﬁes our axioms, when the members of a feasible
coalition of individuals agree that this coalition is the best preferred feasible coalition, this
coalition is formed. Then, it remains to check that the set of feasible coalitions satisﬁes
the single-lapping property. This step is far from being immediate and constitutes the
bulk of the proof. The analysis is relatively simple for three agents societies. We use an
induction argument to extend the result to arbitrary societies.
Theorem 2 shows that only rules that select the unique core-stable partition given
an initial set of feasible coalition satisfy our list of axioms. Hence, Theorem 2 provides
further evidence on the relation between the concepts of strategy-proofness and unique
core-stability. This relation has been already presented in previous works as S¨ onmez
(1999) and P´ apai (2004).9 However, Theorem 2 provides several novelties with respect to
previous results. We do not impose any restrictions either on preferences or on feasible
coalitions that ensure the existence of core-stable partitions. Instead, we obtain that the
rule selects the unique core-stable partition directly from our axioms. This fact allows
us to obtain a characterization result that applies to every kind of coalition formation
problem instead of impossibility results. In addition, our results apply to very restricted
domains of preferences as the smallest minimally rich domain. Finally, we do not use
Pareto eﬃciency in the characterization, instead we use two axioms, non-bossiness and
ﬂexibility, that are not included in the deﬁnition of core-stability.
The domains of additively representable and separable preferences are minimally rich
domains. Hence, we obtain the following corollaries to Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. A rule ϕ : A → Σ satisﬁes strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-
bossiness, and ﬂexibility if and only if ϕ is a single-lapping rule.
Corollary 2. A rule ϕ : S → Σ satisﬁes strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-
bossiness, and ﬂexibility if and only if ϕ is a single-lapping rule.
9The line of research that investigates the existence of strategy-proof rules in core selecting organiza-





























sCorollaries 1 and 2 are in sharp contrast with the results of Barber` a, Sonnenschein,
and Zhou (1991). These authors analyze problems in which the founding members of
a society select new members for the society and their preferences over candidates are
additively representable (or separable). They show that for those coalition formation
problems, strategy-proof rules can be decomposed in a set of yes/no rules, one for each
possible candidate. There are two diﬀerences between their framework and ours. Bar-
ber` a, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) do not consider the preferences of the candidates as
relevant for the social choice. Moreover, they do not consider the restrictions imposed by
individual rationality, that we consider indispensable for the analysis of coalition forma-
tion rules.
Theorem 2 is tight if there are at least four agents. When there are only three agents,
ﬂexibility is directly implied by individual rationality. The following examples show the
independence of the axioms for any arbitrary minimally rich domain ¯ D.10
Example 1 (Strategy-proofness). Let N = {i,j,k}. For each %∈ ¯ D, let
IRi(%) ≡ {C ∈ Ci, such that for each j ∈ C,C %j {j}}.
Let ϕ−SP be such that for each %∈ ¯ D, ϕ
−SP
i (%) ≡ top(IRi(%),%i) and for each j / ∈
top(IRi(%),%i), ϕ
−SP
j (%) ≡ {j}. Note that ϕ−SP satisﬁes individual rationality, non-
bossiness, and ﬂexibility. However, ϕ−SP violates strategy-proofness.11
Example 2 (Individual rationality). Let N = {i,j,k}. Let ϕ−IR be such that for each
%∈ ¯ D, ϕ
−IR
i (%) = top(N,%i), and for each j / ∈ top(N,%i), ϕ
−IR
j (%) = {j}. The
rule ϕ−IR is dictatorial. Note that ϕ−IR satisﬁes strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and
ﬂexibility. However, ϕ−IR violates individual rationality.






{i,j,k} if for each i0 ∈ N,{i,j,k} %i0 {i0},
({i,j},{k}) if {i,j} i {i},{i,j} j {j} and top(N,%k) = {k},
[N] otherwise.
10The following examples are stated in three and four-agent societies. These examples can be easily
generalized to arbitrary societies. This point is discussed in Appendix B.
11In order to check that ϕ−SP is manipulable, let N = {i,j,k}, %∈ D∗, and %0
j∈ D∗
j be such that
{i,j} i {i,j,k} i {i}, {i,j,k} j {i,j} j {j,k} j {j}, and {i,k} k {i,j,k} k {k}; while
{j,k} 0
j {i,j,k} 0
j {j}. Note that ϕ−SP(%) = ({i,j},{k}), while ϕ−SP(%N\{j},%0



































sNote that ϕ−NB satisﬁes individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and ﬂexibility. How-
ever, ϕ−NB violates non-bossiness.12




({i,j},{k,l}) if for each m ∈ N, ({i,j},{k,l}) %m [N],
[N] otherwise.
Note that ϕ−F satisﬁes individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. How-
ever, ϕ−F violates ﬂexibility.
At this point, we clarify the relation between strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and
Pareto eﬃciency. In many frameworks, strategy-proofness and non-bossiness directly
imply Pareto eﬃciency. However, this is not the case in our framework.13 On the other
hand, although we cannot ﬁnd a general and straight-forward argument that shows that
strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto eﬃciency, imply non-bossiness, it
turns out that the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2 are also valid (with minimal
modiﬁcations) if we use Pareto eﬃciency instead of non-bossiness and ﬂexibility. Hence,
we can state the following theorem that parallels Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Let ¯ D be a minimally rich domain. A rule ϕ : ¯ D → Σ satisﬁes strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto eﬃciency if and only if ϕ is a single-lapping
rule.
12In order to check that ϕ−NB violates non-bossiness, let %∈ D∗, %0
k∈ D∗
k be such that {i,j} i {i},
{i,j} j {j}, top(N,%k) = {k}, while {j,k} 0
k {k} 0
k {i,j,k}. Note that ϕ(%) = ({i,j},{k}) and
ϕ(%N\{k},%0
k) = ({i},{j},{k}).
13Consider a society formed by four agents N = {i,j,k,l}. Deﬁne the rule ¯ ϕ in the domain of separable
preferences. Let ¯ ϕ : S → Σ. Agents i and j are the founding members of a club and they are always
together. Then, for each %∈ S, {i} ∈ ¯ ϕj(%), {j} ∈ ¯ ϕi(%). Preferences of agents k and l are irrelevant
for the social choice. Agent k enters the club if i likes agent k. Thus, {k} ∈ ¯ ϕi(%) if {i,k} %i {i}. Agent
l enters the club if j likes l. Thus, {l} ∈ ¯ ϕj(%) if {j,l} %l {j}. The rule ¯ ϕ satisﬁes strategy-proofness,
non-bossiness, and ﬂexibility. However, ¯ ϕ violates individual rationality and Pareto eﬃciency. Let
%∈ S be such that {i,j,k} i {i,k} i {i,j} i {i} i C for each C ∈ Ci \ ({i,j,k},{i,k},{i,j},{i}),
{i,j,l} j {j,l} j {i,j} j {j} j C0 for each C0 ∈ Cj \ ({i,j,l},{j,l},{i,j},{j}), {k} = top(N,%k),
and {l} = top(N,%l). Basically, i likes j and k but strongly dislikes l, j likes i and l and strongly
dislikes k, whereas k and l would rather stay alone. Note that ¯ ϕ(%) = {i,j,k,l}, but for each i0 ∈ N,





























sTheorem 3 shows that, when applied to strategy-proof and individually rational rules,
non-bossiness and ﬂexibility are equivalent to Pareto eﬃciency.14 While sometimes
Pareto eﬃciency may seem a more palatable axiom, we think that in coalition formation
problems, non-bossiness is also easily justiﬁable. We have chosen to use non-bossiness
instead of Pareto eﬃciency because Pareto eﬃciency is part of the deﬁnition of core-
stability. We feel that by introducing individual rationality–no single agent prefers stay
on her own rather than accepting the coalition proposed by the rule– together with Pareto
eﬃciency –all the members of the society do not prefer an alternative partition to the
partition proposed by the rule–, we would introduce too many ingredients of the core in
our framework.
Before moving to the proof of Theorem 2, several remarks are in order.
Our characterization theorems have direct implications for matching problems as mar-
riage, room-mate, and college admission problems. These are coalition formation problems
characterized by initial restrictions of the set of feasible coalitions. In a marriage problem,
agents are divided in two disjoint groups that are usually interpreted as a set of men and
a set of women, and the set of feasible coalitions consists of all single agents and all the
couples formed by a man and a woman. A generalization of marriage problems is known
as theroommate problem. There is a set of agents that have to be organized in couples or
in groups of a given cardinality. These problems can be interpreted as situations in which
there are a number of rooms available and we can assign either 1 or 2 persons to each
room, while some room may remain empty. Another generalization of the marriage prob-
lem is known as the college-admission problem. There are two disjoint sets of agents, a set
of colleges C, and a set of new students S. Each college c ∈ C has a number of free slots
and may admit up to a quota of qc new students. Colleges have preferences over cohorts
of new students. New students have preferences over colleges and classmates. A coalition
is feasible if either is a singleton or it contains exactly one college and the number of stu-
dents assigned to each college is not larger than its respective quota qc. The literature has
provided a series of impossibility results for strategy-proof rules in those environments.
(See Alcalde and Barber` a, 1994; S¨ onmez, 1999; P´ apai, 2004, and references therein.) As
we do not impose any initial condition on the set of feasible, we can apply directly our
14Note that the examples that show the independence of the axioms in Theorem 2 are also valid to
show the independence of the axioms in Theorem 3. It is easy to check that ϕ−SP, ϕ−IR, and ϕ−F satisfy





























sTheorems 2 and 3 to obtain characterization of the rules that satisfy our axioms in these
environments. Thus, for instance, in marriage problems, if there are at least two men and
two women and every diﬀerent-sex couple is feasible, then the set of feasible coalitions
violates Condition (b) of the single-lapping property. In this case, Theorems 2 and 3
imply that we may construct single-lapping rules that satisfy our axioms by not allowing
some couples to form.
Next, we address the issue of whether Theorems 2 and 3 hold for domains of preferences
strictly contained in D∗. As D∗ consists of the union of the domains of bottom and top
preferences, it is natural to check whether there exist non-single-lapping rules that satisfy
our axioms in those domains. It turns out that new possibilities arise in both domains.
The rule ϕ−SP presented in Example 1 satisﬁes strategy-proofness when deﬁned in the
domain of bottom preferences ×i∈ND
−
i .15 On the the other hand, the domain of top
preferences is included in the domain of top-responsive preferences proposed by Alcalde
and Revilla (2004). These authors provide an algorithm – the top-covering algorithm–
that always select a core-stable partition of the society if agents’ preferences are top-
responsive. In addition, their top-covering algorithm deﬁnes the unique Pareto eﬃcient
rule that satisﬁes our axioms in their domain. We must note that in Alcalde and Revilla’s
top-responsive domain, there are preference proﬁles with multiple core stable partitions.
This fact highlights the key role of bottom preferences in obtaining the relation between
strategy-proofness and unique core stability.16 In the light of these examples, we can
interpret Theorems 2 and 3 as minimal domain results. The smallest minimally rich
domain D∗ is a minimal domain for which the single-lapping rules are the unique rules that
satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and either non-bossiness and ﬂexibility,
or Pareto eﬃciency.
Finally, we conclude relating our results to those by S¨ onmez (1999). This author proves
that for coalition formation problems in which there is always a core-stable partition, there
is a rule that satisﬁes strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto eﬃciency if the
set of core-stable partitions is always essentially single-valued. Our results are independent
15See Appendix B for additional details.
16Indeed, individual rationality is easily satisﬁed in the domain of top preferences. Note that any agent
prefers to join the whole society rather than staying alone as long unless her best preferred coalition is
staying alone. Finally, we have to note that Alcalde and Revilla’s results depend crucially on the fact
that every conceivable coalition is feasible. Their top-covering algorithm works if there are no restrictions





























sof S¨ onmez’s results. The main diﬀerence between our framework and S¨ onmez’s one relies
on the domain of preferences over coalitions. S¨ onmez (1999) assumes the existence of
certain preferences that need not exist in a minimally rich domain. Basically, in S¨ onmez’s
framework for each i ∈ N, and each C ∈ (F ϕ ∩ Ci), if there is an admissible preference
%i such that C i {i}, then there is another admissible preference %0
i such that for each
C0 ∈ (F ϕ ∩ Ci) \ {i}, C0 %0
i C if and only if C0 %i C, while C %i C0 if and only if
C %0
i C0 and C %0
i {i} %0
i C0. There are minimally rich domains, namely the domain of
additively representable preferences, for which such preferences are not admissible. Let
i,j,k ∈ N, and assume {i,j},{i,k},{i,j,k} ∈ F ϕ. Let %i∈ Ai be such that {i,j,k} i
{i,j}  {i,k}  {i}, but there is no %0
i∈ Ai such that {i,j,k} 0




6 Proof of Theorem 2
We begin this section by introducing some properties that are implied by our axioms.
These properties incorporate the idea that a rule cannot be against the preferences of
the members of the society. When there is a partition that each agent considers at least
as good as every other partition, a rule should choose that best-preferred partition. A
stronger requirement would be that whenever the members of a coalition consider this
coalition as the best coalition, this coalition should form, independently of the preferences
of the remaining agents in society. Of course, the following axioms refer to rules deﬁned
on a minimally rich domain ¯ D.
Unanimity. Let σ = {C1,...,Cm} ∈ Σ be such that for each t = 1,...,m, Ct ∈ F ϕ.
For each %∈ ¯ D, each t = 1,...,m, and each i ∈ Ct, top(F ϕ,%i) = Ct implies ϕ(%) = σ.
Top-Coalition. Let C ∈ F ϕ and %∈ ¯ D. If for each i ∈ C, top(F ϕ,%i) = C, then for
each i ∈ C, ϕi (%) = C.
It is clear that top-coalition and Pareto eﬃciency imply unanimity. However, Pareto
eﬃciency and top-coalition are logically independent. Note that top-coalition is a prop-
erty of rules. Banerjee, Konishi, and S¨ onmez (2001) use the term top-coalition to name
a property of preference proﬁles. These authors say that a preference proﬁle satisﬁes the





























smutually the best coalitions for all the members of C. Basically, our top-coalition implies
that at a preference proﬁle that satisﬁes Banerjee, Konishi, and S¨ onmez’s top-coalition
property, then the rule selects a partition in which all the coalitions such that all their
members consider as the best feasible coalition are formed.
Lemma 1. Let ¯ D be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : ¯ D → Σ satisﬁes strategy-
proofness, non-bossiness, and ﬂexibility, then ϕ satisﬁes unanimity.
Proof. Let σ = {C1,...,Cm} ∈ Σ be such that for each t = 1,...,m, Ct ∈ F ϕ. Let
%∈ ¯ D be such that for each t = 1,...,m and each i ∈ Ct, top(F ϕ,%i) = Ct. By
ﬂexibility, σ ∈ Rϕ. Then, there is %0∈ ¯ D, such that ϕ(%0) = σ. Let i ∈ N. Let
%00∈ ¯ D be such that %00




N\{i},%i) %i ϕi(%0) = top(F ϕ,%i). Then, ϕi(%0
N\{i},%i) = ϕi(%0) = top(F ϕ,%i). By
non-bossiness, ϕ(%0
N\{i},%i) = ϕ(%0). Repeating the argument as many times as neces-
sary, we obtain ϕ(%) = ϕ(%0).
Lemma 2. Let ¯ D be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : ¯ D → Σ satisﬁes strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and ﬂexibility, then ϕ satisﬁes top-coalition.
Proof. Let C ∈ F ϕ. Let %∈ ¯ D be such that for each i ∈ C, top(F ϕ,%i) = C. If
#C = 1, then the result follows from individual rationality. If C = N, then the result
is immediate by unanimity. Let %0∈ ¯ D be such that for each i ∈ C, top(F ϕ,%0
i) = C,
for each C0 ∈ Ci such that there is j ∈ (C0 \ C), {i} i C0, and for each k / ∈ C,
%k=%0
k.17 By individual rationality, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%0) ⊆ C. Let %00∈ A be such
that for each i ∈ C, %0
i=%00




k) = ϕk(%0). By non-bossiness, ϕ(%0
N\{k},%00
k) = ϕ(%0).
Repeating the arguments for each k ∈ (N \ C), ϕ(%0) = ϕ(%00). By unanimity, for each
i ∈ C, ϕi(%00) = C. Then, ϕi(%0) = C. Finally, let i ∈ C. By strategy-proofness,
ϕi(%0
N\{i},%i) %i ϕi(%0). Then, ϕi(%0
N\{i},%i) = C. Repeating the argument as many
times as necessary, we obtain that for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%) = C.
In the following lemma we prove that agents’ preferences over infeasible coalitions are
irrelevant for the social choice.
17Note that ×i∈ND
−






























sLemma 3. Let ¯ D be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : ¯ D → Σ satisﬁes strategy-
proofness and non-bossiness, then, for each %,%0∈ ¯ D such that for each i ∈ N, and each
C,C0 ∈ (F ϕ ∩ Ci), C i C0 if and only if C 0
i C0, ϕ(%) = ϕ(%0).
Proof. Let %,%0∈ ¯ D be such that for each i ∈ N, and each C,C0 ∈ (F ϕ ∩ Ci), C i C0
if and only if C 0




i). Because for each C,C0 ∈ (F ϕ ∩ Ci), C i C0 if and only if
C 0
i C0, we have ϕi(%) = ϕi(%N\{i},%0
i). By non-bossiness, ϕ(%) = ϕ(%N\{i},%0
i).
Repeating the argument as many times as necessary, we get ϕ(%) = ϕ(%0).
The following lemma presents the crucial step in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 4. Let ¯ D be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : ¯ D → Σ satisﬁes strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and ﬂexibility, then F ϕ satisﬁes the single-
lapping property.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of agents. We ﬁrst focus on three-agent
societies. Then, we extend the result to arbitrary societies. We use extensively throughout
the proof the fact that D∗ ⊆ ¯ D.
Claim 1. Let n = 3, then F ϕ satisﬁes Condition (a) of the single-lapping property.
Proof. Let N = {i,j,k}. Assume to the contrary that F ϕ does not satisfy Condition (a).
Then, there are C,C0 ∈ F ϕ such that #(C ∩ C0) ≥ 2. We have two cases.
Case (1.1): F ϕ = {{i},{j},{k},{i,j},{i,j,k}}.
Let ¯ %k ∈ D∗
k be such that {i,j,k}¯ k{i,k}¯ k{j,k}¯ k{k}. Let the rule ¯ ϕ{i,j} : ¯ D{i,j} → Σ
be such that for each %{i,j}∈ ¯ D{i,j}, ¯ ϕ{i,j}(%{i,j}) ≡ ϕ(%{i,j}, ¯ %k). By ϕ’s strategy-




By Remark 1, agent i and agent j’s preferences over the partitions in R¯ ϕ{i,j} are unre-





























sagents’ preferences over the elements of the range are unrestricted. Then, by the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem, ¯ ϕ{i,j} is dictatorial. Assume that i is the dictator for ¯ ϕ{i,j}. Let
%{i,j}∈ D∗
{i,j} be such that {i,j,k} i {i,j} i {i} and {j} j {i,j} j {i,j,k}. Then,
ϕ(%{i,j}, ¯ %k) = {i,j,k}, but {j} j ϕj(%), which violates individual rationality, a con-
tradiction.
Case (1.2) {{i},{j},{k},{i,j},{j,k},{i,j,k}} ⊆ F ϕ.









By top-coalition, ϕ(%1) = ({i,j},{k}).
Let %2∈ D∗ be such that %2
N\{i}=%1




By strategy-proofness, ϕi(%2) %2
i ϕi(%1). Then, ϕi(%2) is either {i,j,k} or {i,j}. Be-
cause {j} 2
j {i,j,k}, by individual rationality, ϕi(%2) = {i,j}. Then, by non-bossiness,
ϕ(%2) = ϕ(%1).
Let %3∈ D∗ be such that %3
N\{j}=%2
N\{j} and {i,j} %3
j {i,j,k} %3
j {j}. By strategy-
proofness, ϕj (%3) %3
j ϕj(%2). Then, ϕj(%3) = {i,j}. By non-bossiness, ϕ(%3) = ϕ(%2).
Now, let %4∈ D∗ be such that %4
N\{i}=%3











By individual rationality, ϕi(%4) 6= {i,j}, ϕk(%4) 6= {i,k}, and ϕj(%4) 6= {j,k}. By
strategy-proofness, ϕi(%3) %3
i ϕ(%4). Note that, {i,j,k} 3







































k {k}. By top-coalition, ϕk(%5
N\{k},%4
k) = {j,k}. By strategy-proofness,
ϕk(%5) %5
k {j,k}. Because {j} 5
j {i,j,k}, by individual rationality, ϕ(%5) = ({i},{j,k}).
Let %6∈ D∗ be such that %6
N\{j}=%5




that, by unanimity, ϕ(%6
N\{i},%3
i) = {i,j,k}. Hence, by strategy-proofness, ϕi(%6) %i {i,j,k}.
Then, ϕ(%6) = {i,j,k}.













Note that the only diﬀerence between %4 and %7 consists of k’s preference. By strategy-
proofness, ϕj (%7) %7
j ϕj (%6) = {i,j,k}. By individual rationality, if j ∈ ϕi(%7), then
ϕi(%7) = {i,j,k}. Hence, ϕ(%7) = {i,j,k}. However, ϕk (%7) 4
k ϕk (%4), which violates
strategy-proofness, a contradiction.
Cases (1.1) and (1.2) exhaust (up to a relabelling the agents) all the possibilities.
Then, F ϕ satisﬁes Condition (a), which concludes the proof of Claim 1. 
Claim 2. Let n = 3, then F ϕ satisﬁes Condition (b) of the single-lapping property.
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that F ϕ does not satisfy Condition (b). Then, there is
a list of coalitions {C1,...,Cm} ⊂ F ϕ, with m ≥ 3 and m + 1 = 1 such that for each
t = 1,...,m, #(Ct ∩ Ct+1) ≥ 1 and for no i ∈ N, (Ct ∩ Ct+1) = {i}. By Claim 1, ϕ
satisﬁes Condition (a). Then, we have F ϕ = {{i},{j},{k},{i,j},{j,k},{i,k}}. Thus,
for each %∈ ¯ D, there is i0 ∈ {i,j,k} such that
ϕi0(%) = {i
0} (*)
Let %∈ D∗ be such that {i,j} i {i,k} i {i},18 {j,k} j {i,j} j {j}, and
{i,k} k {j,k} k {k}. Let P ∈ P be such that k P i P j, and let %0
i∈ D∗
i be
































i (P). Because top(F ϕ,%0
i) = top(F ϕ,%k) = {i,k}, by top-coalition, we have that
ϕ(%N\{i},%0
i) = ({i,k},{j}). By strategy-proofness, ϕi(%) i ϕ(%N\{i},%0
i). Then, we
have that ϕi(%) 6= {i}. Using parallel arguments, we get ϕj(%) 6= {j} and ϕk(%) 6= {k},
which contradicts (*) and concludes the proof of Claim 2. 
Now, we extend the result to arbitrary ﬁnite societies.
Induction Step. There is m ≥ 3 such that for n = m, if the n-agent rule ϕ satisﬁes
strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and ﬂexibility, then F ϕ satisﬁes
the single-lapping property. We prove that this is true for n = m + 1.
By Claims 1 and 2, the induction hypothesis is true for m = 3. Let n = m+1. Assume
that ϕ satisﬁes strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and ﬂexibility.
First, we prove two facts.
Fact 1. For each C,C0 ∈ F ϕ such that C ∪ C0 6= N, #(C ∩ C0) = 1.
Proof. Let C,C0 ∈ F ϕ be such that (C ∪ C0) 6= N. Let j ∈ N \ (C ∪ C0). Let ¯ %j ∈ D∗
j
be such that for each C ∈ Cj, C 6= {j}, {j}¯ jC. Let ΣN\{j} denote all the partitions
of the reduced society N \ {j}. Deﬁne the rule ¯ ϕN\{j} : ¯ DN\{j} → ΣN\{j} in such a way
that for each %N\{j}∈ ¯ DN\{j}, (¯ ϕN\{j}(%N\{j}),{j}) ≡ ϕ(%N\{j}, ¯ %j). By ϕ’s strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and ﬂexibility, ¯ ϕN\{j} satisﬁes strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and ﬂexibility. By the induction hypoth-
esis, F ¯ ϕN\{j} satisﬁes the single-lapping property. By ϕ’s ﬂexibility, C,C0 ∈ F ¯ ϕN\{j}, then
#(C ∩ C0) = 1. 
Similar arguments apply to prove the following fact.
Fact 2. For each {C1,...,Cm} ⊆ Π with m ≥ 3, ∪m
t=1Ct 6= N, and for each t = 1,...,m,
#(Ct ∩ Ct+1) ≥ 1 (where m + 1 = 1), there is i ∈ N such that for each t = 1,...,m,
Ct ∩ Ct+1 = {i}.





























sProof. Assume, to the contrary, that there are C,C0 ∈ F ϕ such that (C ∪ C0) = N, and
#(C ∩ C0) ≥ 2. We replicate the arguments of three-agent societies. There are three
cases:
Case (1.00) Let C,C0 6= N.
By Fact 1, either F ϕ = {[N],C,C0}, or F ϕ = {[N],C,C0,N}. Let ¯ %N\(C∩C0) ∈ D∗
N\(C∩C0)
be such that for each j ∈ (C \ C0), top(F ϕ,%j) = C, whereas for each k ∈ (C0 \ C),
top(F ϕ,%k) = C0. Deﬁne the rule ¯ ϕC∩C0 : ¯ DC∩C0 → Σ in such a way that for each
%C∩C0∈ ¯ DC∩C0, ¯ ϕC∩C0(%C∩C0) ≡ ϕ(%C∩C0, ¯ %N\(C∩C0)). Because ϕ is strategy-proof, ¯ ϕC∩C0
is strategy-proof. Moreover, by top-coalition, R¯ ϕC∩C0
= {[N],(C,[C0 \ C]),(C0,[C \ C0])}.
By Remark 1, the preferences of the agents in (C∩C0) over the partitions in R¯ ϕC∩C0
are not
restricted. By the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, ϕC∩C0 is dictatorial. Let i ∈ (C ∩C0)
be a dictator for ϕC∩C0. Let %C∩C0∈ D∗
C∩C0 be such that top(F ¯ ϕC∩C0
,%i) = C0, and for
each j ∈ (C∩C0)\{i}, top(F ¯ ϕC∩C0
,%j) = {j}. Then, ϕ(%C∩C0, ¯ %N\(C∪C0)) = (C0,[C\C0]),
which violates ϕ’s individual rationality, a contradiction.
Case (1.10) Let C0 = N, and for no j ∈ C there is k ∈ N \C and C00 ⊂ N with C00 ∈ F ϕ
such that {j,k} ⊆ C00.
Let %N\C∈ D∗
N\C be such that for each j ∈ (N\C), top(F ϕ, ¯ j) = N. Deﬁne now the rule
¯ ϕC : ¯ DC → Σ in the following way. For each %C∈ ¯ D∗, ¯ ϕC(C) ≡ ϕ(%C, ¯ %N\C). Clearly,
¯ ϕC satisﬁes strategy-proofness. Moreover, by top-coalition, for each i ∈ C, F ϕ∩Ci = F ¯ ϕC.
Hence, by Remark 1, the preferences of the agents in C over partitions in R¯ ϕC are not
restricted. By the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, ¯ ϕC is dictatorial, which, by an already
familiar argument, violates ϕ’s individual rationality, a contradiction.
Case (1.20) Let C0 = N, and for some j ∈ C there is k ∈ N \ C and C00 ⊂ N with
C00 ∈ F ϕ such that {j,k} ⊆ C00.
Note ﬁrst that, by Fact 1, for each C00 ∈ (F ϕ \ N), #(C ∩ C00) ≤ 1. Moreover, by






























sLet C,N ∈ F ϕ, let j ∈ C be such that for some T ⊆ N \ C, T ∪ {j} ∈ F ϕ. Let
¯ C ≡ C \ {j}. Let T 0 ∈ F ϕ \ {C,N}. By Fact 1, there is no i ∈ C \ {j}, such that
{i,j} ⊆ T 0. By Fact 2, there is no k ∈ T such that {i,k} ⊆ T 0.
Let %1∈ D∗ be such that for each i ∈ ¯ C, there is P 1








i ), for j there is P 1
j ∈ P with N
+





while for each k ∈ N \ C, there is P 1
k ∈ P with N
+





By top-coalition, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%1) = C.
Next, let %2∈ D∗ be such that %1
N\ ¯ C=%2
N\ ¯ C, while for each i ∈ ¯ C there is P 2
i ∈








i ). Note that for each
i ∈ ¯ C, N = top(F ϕ,%2
i) and C = top(F ϕ \ N,%2




i ϕi(%1) = C. By individual rationality, ϕj(%1
N\{i},%2
i) 6= N. Then,
ϕi(%1
N\{i},%2
i) = C. By non-bossiness, ϕ(%1
N\{i},%2
i) = ϕ(%1). Repeating the same
argument iteratively with each i ∈ ¯ C, we get ϕ(%2) = ϕ(%1).






j ). Note that top(F ϕ,%3
j) = C.
By strategy-proofness, ϕj(%3) %3
j ϕ(%2). Then, ϕj(%3) = C, and by non-bossiness,
ϕ(%3) = ϕ(%2).
Let %4∈ D∗ be such that %3
N\ ¯ C=%4
N\ ¯ C, while for each i ∈ ¯ C there is P 4
i ∈ P such that
for some ¯ k ∈ T, max(N,P 4
i ) = ¯ k, N
+
i (P 4




i ). Note that by Fact
2 and our assumptions on F ϕ, for each i ∈ ¯ C, top(F ϕ,P 4
i ) = N, and for each C ∈ F ϕ∩Ci,
if C 6= N, then {i} %4






i) 6= N. Repeating the argument for each i ∈ ¯ C, we obtain that
ϕ(%4) 6= N. Clearly, for each i ∈ ¯ C, N is the only coalition in F ϕ that is preferred to
staying on her own. On the other hand, for agent j, the coalitions that are preferred to
staying alone include some member of ¯ C. Finally, each agent k ∈ N \ C requires the
presence of agent j in order to consider a coalition better than staying on her own. Then,
by individual rationality, we have that ϕ(%4) = [N].
Consider now the proﬁle %5∈ D∗, such that for each i ∈ ¯ C, %5
i=%4
i, for some P 5
j ∈ P
such that there is ¯ k ∈ T, with max(N,P 5
j ) = ¯ k and N
+
j (P 5





while for each k ∈ N \ C, there is P 5
k ∈ P such that j = max(N,P 5








k). By unanimity, ϕ(%5) = N.





we only change agent j’s preferences with respect to the previous proﬁle. By strategy-





























sthen ϕi(%6) = N. Hence, ϕ(%6) = N. Clearly, %6 only diﬀers from %4 in the preferences




k ϕk(%6) = N . Then, j ∈ ϕk(%6
N\{k},%4
k). By individual rationality,
there is i ∈ ¯ C such that i ∈ ϕj(%6
N\{k},%4
k). By Fact 1 and our assumptions over F ϕ,
ϕ(%6
N\{k},%4
k) = N . Repeating the argument as many times as necessary, we get that
ϕ(%4) = N, a contradiction.
Cases (1.00), (1.10) and (1.20) exhaust all the possibilities. Then, this suﬃces to prove
that F ϕ satisﬁes Condition (a). 
Claim 20. F ϕ satisﬁes Condition (b).
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that ϕ does not satisfy Condition (b). Then, there is
a list of coalitions {C1,...,Cm}, with m ≥ 3 such that for each t = 1,...,m, (m + 1 = 1),
(Ct ∩ Ct+1) 6= {∅}, and there is no i ∈ N such that for each t = 1,...,m, {i} = (Ct ∩ Ct+1).
Because we have just proved that F ϕ satisﬁes Condition (a) of the single-lapping prop-
erty, we have that for each t = 1,...,m, #(Ct ∩ Ct+1) = 1. By Fact 2, ∪m
t=1Ct = N.
Moreover, F ϕ = {C1,...,Cm} ∪ [N].
For each t = 1,...,m, let it ≡ (Ct ∩ Ct+1). Note that for each t = 1,...,m and
each j ∈ (Ct \ {it−1,it}), F ϕ ∩ Cj = {Ct,{j}}. On the other hand, for each t = 1,...,m,
F ϕ ∩ Cit = {Ct,Ct+1,{it}}. Then, by Remark 1, minimal richness of the domain of
preferences does not introduce any restriction on how the agents may order the diﬀerent
coalitions they may belong to. From now on, we only describe agents’ preferences over
feasible coalitions.
For each t = 1,...,m, let it ≡ (Ct ∩ Ct+1). Let %∈ ¯ D be such that for each
t = 1,...,m and each j ∈ (Ct \ {it−1,it}), top(F ϕ,%j) = Ct, and for each t = 1,...,m,
top(F ϕ,%it) = Ct+1, and Ct it {it}. Let t ∈ {1,...,m}. Let %0
it∈ ¯ Dit be such
that top(F ϕ,%0
it) = Ct. By top-coalition, ϕit(%N\{it},%0
it) = Ct. By strategy-proofness,
ϕit(%) %it ϕit(%N\{it},%0
it). Thus, for each t = 1,...,m; ϕit(%) %it Ct.
Assume ﬁrst that m is odd. Then, there is t0 ∈ {1,...,m} such that ϕit0(%) = {it0},
a contradiction with ϕit(%) %it Ct for each t = 1,...,m.
Assume now that m is even. Without loss of generality, assume that for each t odd,































¯ t (P¯ t) = C¯ t+1. Let %0
i¯ t=%
−
¯ t (P¯ t) ∈ D∗
i¯ t. Note that top(F ϕ,%0
i¯ t) = C¯ t+1 and for each
T * C¯ t+1, {i¯ t} 0
i¯ t T. By individual rationality, ϕi¯ t(%N\{i¯ t},%0
i¯ t) 6= C¯ t. Let %0
i¯ t−1∈ D∗
i¯ t−1
be such that top(F ϕ,%0
i¯ t−1) = C¯ t−1. By top-coalition, ϕi¯ t−1(%N\{i¯ t−1,i¯ t},%0
{i¯ t−1,i¯ t}) = C¯ t−1.
By strategy-proofness, we have that ϕi¯ t−1(%N\{i¯ t},%0
{i¯ t}) %i¯ t−1 ϕi¯ t−1(%N\{i¯ t−1,i¯ t},%0
{i¯ t−1,i¯ t}).
Then, ϕi¯ t−1(%N\{i¯ t},%0
i¯ t) = C¯ t−1, and ϕi¯ t−2(%N\{i¯ t},%0
i¯ t) = C¯ t−1. Repeating the argument
as many times as necessary, for each t odd, ϕit(%N\{i¯ t},%0
i¯ t) = Ct, while for each t0 even
ϕit0(%N\{i¯ t},%0
i¯ t) = Ct0+1, and ϕi¯ t(%N\{i¯ t},%0
i¯ t) = C¯ t+1. Then, we get ϕi¯ t(%N\{i¯ t},%0
i¯ t) i¯ t ϕi¯ t(%),
which violates strategy-proofness, and suﬃces to prove Claim 20 and Lemma 4.
Proof of Theorem 2. From Theorem 1, every single-lapping rule satisﬁes strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and ﬂexibility. Hence, we focus on the con-
verse implication. Let ϕ satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness,
and ﬂexibility. By Lemma 2, ϕ satisﬁes top-coalition. Let %∈ ¯ D. By Lemma 4, F ϕ
satisﬁes the single-lapping property. Thus, there is C ∈ F ϕ such that for each i ∈ C,
top(F ϕ,%i) = C. By top-coalition, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%) = C. Moreover, by top-coalition,
for each %0∈ ¯ D such that %C=%0
C, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%0) = C. Let ΣN\C denote the
set of all possible partitions of the reduced society N \ C. Deﬁne now the restricted
social choice function ¯ ϕN\C : ¯ DN\C → ΣN\C, in such a way that for each %N\C∈ ¯ DN\C,
(¯ ϕN\C(%N\C),C) ≡ ϕ(%N\C,%C). Clearly, ¯ ϕN\C satisﬁes strategy-proofness, individual
rationality, non-bossiness, and ﬂexibility. Moreover, F ¯ ϕN\C = {C0 ∈ F ϕ,C ∩ C0 = {∅}},
and F ¯ ϕN\C satisﬁes the single-lapping property. Repeating the same arguments as many
times as necessary, we get ϕ(%) = ¯ σFϕ(%).
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